
About
Bogdan is a philosopher and logician who, for the purposes of this website, acquired the disturbing habit of speaking of himself in the third person.
Currently, Bogdan is a postdoc at the University of Cagliari, where he works in the ALOPHIS research group.Bogdan moved! As of September 2017, he's a postdoc at the Centre for Philosophy of the University of Lisbon.As of the 1st of January 2024 Bogdan joined the Philosophy Department of the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa.
Before becoming a humble proletarian, Bogdan obtained his PhD from the University of Melbourne with a thesis on logical pluralism written under the supervision of Greg Restall.
What the future will bring, no one knows.
Bogdan is also on twitter and instagram (though he forgot his password). Bogdan blogs here.

Papers
Here unfolds the tragedy of Bogdan's Nachgelassene. Each paper lost to the Nachgelassene gets listed here. A click on the titles below will open the abstract of the paper, the publication data and a link to a surprise pdf.

A novel defence of meaninginvariant logical pluralism
When: 2016
Where: Mind (125(499):727757; doi:10.1093/mind/fzv214)
What about: In this paper I offer a prooftheoretic defence of meaninginvariant logical pluralism. I argue that there is a relation of codetermination between the operational and structural aspects of a logic. As a result, some features of the consequence relation are induced by the connectives. I propose that a connective is defined by those rules which are conservative and unique, while at the same time expressing only connectiveinduced structural information. This is the key to stabilizing the meaning of the connectives across multiple determinations of the consequence relation.
Read it here.

Weak disharmony: some lessons for prooftheoretic semantics
When: 2016
Where: The Review of Symbolic Logic (9(3):583602; doi:10.1017/S1755020316000162)
What about: A logical constant is weakly disharmonious if its elimination rules are weaker than its introduction rules. Substructural weak disharmony is the weak disharmony generated by structural restrictions on the eliminations. I argue that substructural weak disharmony is not a defect of the constants which exhibit it. To the extent that it is problematic, it calls into question the structural properties of the derivability relation. This prompts us to rethink the issue of controlling the structural properties of a logic by means of harmony. I argue that such a control is possible and desirable. Moreover, it is best achieved by global tests of harmony.
Read it here.

ST, LP, and tolerant metainferences (with Francesco Paoli)
When: forthcoming
Where: C. Baskent and T. Ferguson (eds.), Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency
What about: The stricttolerant (ST) approach to paradox promises to erect theories of naïve truth and tolerant vagueness on the safe bedrock of classical logic. We assess the extent to which this claim is founded. Building on some results by Girard [11], we show that the usual prooftheoretic formulation of propositional ST in terms of the classical sequent calculus without primitive Cut is incomplete with respect to STvalid metainferences, and exhibit a complete calculus for the same class of metainferences. We also argue that the latter calculus, far from coinciding with classical logic, is a close kin of Priest’s LP.
Read a drafthere.

On a generality condition in prooftheoretic semantics
When: 2017
Where: Theoria
What about: Recently, Nissim Francez defended a generality condition on defining rules in prooftheoretic semantics, according to which the schematic formulation of the defining rules must be maximally general. (See his wonderful book, Prooftheoretic semantics.) Context variables must always be present in the schematic rules and they should range over arbitrary collections of formulae. Moreover, no restrictions must be placed on the contexts of these rules. I argue against imposing such a condition.
Read it here

Hopeful monsters: A note on multiple conclusions
When: forthcoming 2018
Where: Erkenntnis
What about: Arguments are usually understood as having one or more premises and only one conclusion. However, this notion of argument can be generalised and we may let arguments have not one, but several disjunctively connected conclusions. This is a contentious generalisation. In this paper I will argue that it is, nonetheless, justified. I argue that multiple conclusions are epiphenomena of the logical connectives. That is, I argue that some connectives induces multipleconclusion derivations. In this sense, such derivations are completely natural. Moreover, I argue that they can safely be used in the prooftheoretic semantics.
Read it here.

Variations on intratheoretical logical pluralism: Internal vs. external consequence
When: forthcoming 2018
Where: Philosophical Studies
What about: Intratheoretical logical pluralism is a form of meaninginvariant pluralism about logic, articulated recently by Hjortland (2013). This version of pluralism relies on it being possible to define several distinct notions of provability relative to the same logical calculus. The present paper picks up and explores this theme: How can a single logical calculus express several different consequence relations? The main hypothesis articulated here is that the divide between the internal and external consequence relations in Gentzen systems generates a form of intratheoretical logical pluralism.
Read it here.

The original sin of prooftheoretic semantics (with Francesco Paoli)
When: forthcoming
Where: Synthese
What about: Prooftheoretic semantics is an alternative to modeltheoretic seman tics. It aims at explaining the meaning of the logical constants in terms of the inference rules that govern their behaviour in proofs. We argue that this must be construed as the task of explaining these meanings relative to a logic, i.e., to a consequence relation. Alas, there is no agreed set of properties that a relation must have in order to qualify as a consequence relation. Moreover, the association of a consequence relation to a logical calculus is not as straightforward as it may seem. We show that these facts are problematic for the prooftheoretic project but the problems can be solved. Our thesis is that the consequence relation relevant for proof theoretic semantics is the one given be the sequenttosequent derivability relation in Gentzen systems.
Read it here.

Cut for bilateralist intuitionists
When: forthcoming (accepted 2019)
Where: Analysis
What about: On a bilateralist reading, sequents are interpreted as statements to the effect that, given the assertion of the antecedent it is incoherent to deny the succedent. This interpretation goes against its own ecumenical ambitions, endowing Cut with a meaning very close to that of tertium non datur and thus rendering it intuitionistically unpalatable. This paper explores a topdown route for arguing that, even intuitionistically, a prohibition to deny is as strong as a license to assert. (Note: The official title of the paper is 'Ask not what bilateralist intuitionists can do for Cut, but what Cut can do for bilateralist intuitionism'.)
Read it here.

Requiem for logical nihilism
When: forthcoming (accepted 2019)
Where: Synthese
What about: Logical nihilism is the view that the relation of logical consequence is empty: there are counterexamples to any putative logical law. In this paper, I argue that the nihilist threat is illusory. The nihilistic arguments do not work. Moreover, the entire project is based on a misguided interpretation of the generality of logic. (Note: The full title of the paper is 'Requiem for logical nihilism (Or: Logical nihilism annihilated)'.)
Read it here.

Reflective equilibrium on the fringe
When: forthcoming (accepted 2019)
Where: Dialectica
What about: Reflective equilibrium, as a methodology for the `formation of logics', fails on the fringe, i.e., where intricate details can make or break a logical theory. On the fringe, the process of theorification cannot be methodologically governed by anything like reflective equilibrium. When logical theorising gets tricky, there is nothing on the pretheoretical side on which our theoretical claims can reflect of  at least not in any meaningful way. Indeed, the fringe is exclusively the domain of theoretical negotiations and the methodological power of reflective equilibrium is merely nominal. (Note: The full title of the paper is, I kid you not, 'Reflective equilibrium on the fringe: The tragic threefold story of a failed methodology for logical theorising'.)
Read it: here.

Substructural heresies
When: 2023
Where: Inquiry
What about: This paper discusses two revisionary views about substructurality. The first attempts to reduce the structural features of a logic to properties of its logical vocabulary. It will be found to be untenable. The second aims to separate the structural features of a logic from the properties of logical consequence and to reinterpreted them as sui generis proof resources. I will argue that it is a viable path for a renewed understanding of substructurality.)
Read it: here.


Drafts and wip
Bogdan is a bit more reluctant when it comes to sharing drafts. So, until he gathers up his courage, here are the tentative titles and abstracts of the draft papers. If you really want them, drop him an email saying so.

Substructurality and the metainferential conception of logic
Abstract will follow shortly.

A defence of Belnapian harmony
Dummett identified harmony with conservativeness, which, as you recall, was half of Belnap's solution to tonk. The other half is uniqueness. Conservativeness is tricky. It is a global property of proof systems and it seems wrong to take it as the formal mark of a local property of introductionelimination rules. In this paper I argue that this shouldn't be a worry. Indeed, Belnap's dual criterion of definitional success is the best formal expression of harmony.

That paper on Finnis on gay marriage that still needs a title
Reshaping the ideas of a plump Italian monk from the Middle Ages into the basis of sexual morality in the 21st century is a stroke of genius. Of course, it doesn't work. In this paper I try to show that it doesn't work in the particular case of gay marriage. Now, this has been done quite a number of times. (It looks easy enough, right?) Well, here I'm trying to put myself into Finnis' shoes and show that it doesn't work by his own lights. Lights out (not literally!) and get on to it, however you like it! We need link, don't we? It's here.


Teaching

Meaning, rules, and proofs
This year Bogdan is teaching a doctoral course on prooftheoretic semantics and some other stuff. It's fun. He has one formal student, so he feels a bit like Frege. Fortunately, there's no reason for him to feel like Violetta (you know, solo, abbandonato in questo popoloso deserto and so on and so forth). That's because he has a wider audience consisting of other students, colleagues, and supracolleagues (i.e., the boss, Francesco Paoli). Click here for the syllabus.


PSAST

PSAST=Proof Society Autumn School Tutorial
Bogdan will teach a Tutorial on ProofTheoretis Semantics at the 4th International Autumn School on Proof Theory which will take place between the 7th and the 10th November at the University of Utrecht. More information about the event is available here. Click around that page to find more about the Society. For more about the tutorial, keep reading or click here for a pdf version of the text to follow.
Prooftheoretic semantics (PTS) is an inferentialist theory of meaning which originates in the work of Gentzen in the 1930s and was subsequently devel oped by Prawitz, MartinLof, Dummett, and more recently by SchroederHeister, who also baptised the theory, and many others. It is an alternative to Tarskian modeltheoretic semantics, aiming to explain the meaning of the logical constants in terms of the rules of inference that govern their behaviour in proofs. The orthodox version of PTS, developed against the background of natural deduction, can be described as an extended attempt to develop Gentzen’s suggestion that ‘the introduction [rules] represent, as it were, the ‘definitions’ of the [logical constants], and the eliminations are no more [...] than the consequences of these definitions’. At its core lies the notion of harmony: a kind of balance between the relative strength of the introductions and eliminations of a logical constant that testifies to their successfully defining a logical constant. The quest for a formal property that accurately captures the intuitive notion of harmony has dominated much of PTS. Said quest is the source of less orthodox versions of PTS. By and large, these retain the focus on harmony, while taking revisionary stances with respect to other aspects of orthodox PTS, such as the priority of the standard assertionist setting of PTS, or of natural deduction. The first part of the tutorial will critically discuss orthodox PTS, focusing on the development of different conceptions of harmony and their con nection with formal properties of Gentzenstyle calculi, such as reducibility, invertibility and normalizability or cutelimination. The second part of the tutorial is devoted to less orthodox stances in PTS. We will first look at bilateralist versions of the programme, which put denial on a par with assertion and thus introduce a new dimension of harmony, between the conditions for asserting and, respectively, denying a sentence. Finally, we will look at versions of PTS that take the sequent calculus as the framework of choice for specifying definitional rules for the logical connectives. We will explore the motivation(s) for going down this path and some results obtained within this framework.
We will cover the following topics:
Orthodox PTS
The Gentzenian roots of PTS
Gentzen style calculi
Introductions as definitions; philosophical grounding and harmony
Reducibility and the justification of the eliminations; prooftheoretic validity
Further developments
Prior’s tonk and a different measure of harmony
Conservativeness, normalisability and cutelimination; the subformula property
Local and global harmony; definitional rules revisited
Weak and strong disharmony; stability
Less orthodox PTS
Bilateralism
Assertion and denial on all fours
Bilateralism in natural deduction; which rules?
Bilateralism in the sequent calculus
The sequent calculus as a basis for PTS
The metatheoretic interpretations of the sequent calculus; sequents as relata of consequence
Harmony and invertibility
Nontransitive and nonreflexive logics; invertibility revisited
Literature guide
The classics. The fundamental texts of PTS are (Gentzen 1935; Prawitz 1965) and (dummett91?). Another important historical reference is (MartinLöf 1996), although this tutorial will not engage much with this strand of PTS.
Overviews. For a fast paced yet comprehensive survey of many important topics in PTS, see (SchroederHeister 2018). (Francez 2015) is the only extant modern monograph on the topic, reporting a wealth of new results mainly in the orthodox tradition, with interesting glimpses into bilateralism as well.
The texts mentioned in the previous two paragraph just about cover topic (I), particularly if the list of references in (SchroederHeister 2018) is used as a resource. An extensive analysis of the extant conceptions of prooftheoretic validity can be found in (SchroederHeister 2006).
Prior’s tonk is introduced in (Prior 1960); PTS (in particular (dummett91?)) draws heavily on the solution to it proposed in (Belnap 1962). For a wider perspective on Belnap’s approach to definitional success, see (Restall 2010). The relation between normalisation and cutelimination is explored at length in (Ungar 1992). The mysteriously titled topic ‘definitional rules revisited’ has to do with the topics broached in (Prawitz 2007); see also (Queiroz 2008), (SchroederHeister 2007b); see also (Bogdan Dicher 2020).
For topics b ii an iii (local and global harmony) as well as b iv, one can start from (Steinberger 2011) and (Bogdan Dicher 2016). (Read 2010) is important for reviving Gentzen’s idea that the elimination rules are a ‘function’ of the introductions. For the last topic (stability), see also (Jacinto and Read 2017).
Prooftheoretic bilateralism is by now a wellestablished field of inquiry. Against the background of natural deduction, it has resurged with particular vigour in (Rumfitt 2000); see also (Francez 2015). For a historically informed wider analysis of bilaterlaism, see (Humberstone 2000). Rumfitt’s proposal is problematic, as shown by (Ferreira 2008) and his solution ((Rumfitt 2008)) less than satisfactory. See also (ValleInclan and Schlöder 2022). For sequentcalculus approaches to bilateralism, see (Restall 2005) and also (Bogdan Dicher 2019). For a different take on the same issue, see (SchroederHeister 2007a).
For the topics under 2(b): the socalled metatheoretic interpretation of the sequent calculus is pervasive, albeit mostly understated, throughout the history of PTS. Clear statements of the position can be found in (Hacking 1979; Tennant 2017). A forceful criticism of the view appears in (SchroederHeister 2011); see also (SchroederHeister 2008). The view that sequent are the proper consequence carrier if further developed in (Bogdan Dicher and Paoli 2021). A tentative theory of harmony appropriate for this new setting is provided in (B. Dicher and Paoli, n.d.).
Belnap, Nuel D. 1962. “Tonk, Plonk and Plink.” Analysis 22: 130–34.Dicher, Bogdan. 2016. “Weak Disharmony: Some Lessons for ProofTheoretic Semantics.” Review of Symbolic Logic 9 (3): 583–602.———. 2019. “Ask not what bilateralist intuitionists can do for Cut, but what Cut can do for bilateralist intuitionism.” Analysis 80 (1): 30–40. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz023.———. 2020. “Hopeful Monsters: A Note on Multiple Conclusions.” Erkenntnis 85: 77–98. https://doi.org/10.1007/s1067001800193.Dicher, Bogdan, and Francesco Paoli. 2021. “The Original Sin of ProofTheoretic Semantics.” Synthese 198: 615–40. https://doi.org/10.1007/s1122901802048x.Dicher, B., and F. Paoli. n.d. “On Harmony and Metasequents (or: Harmony Without Identity and Cut).”Ferreira, Fernando. 2008. “The Coordination Principles: A Problem for Bilateralism.” Mind 117 (468): 1051–57. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzn036.Francez, Nissim. 2015. ProofTheoretic Semantics. College Publications.Gentzen, Gerhard. 1935. “Untersuchungen über Das Logische Schließen. I,II.” Mathematische Zeitschrift 39 (1): 176210; 405431.Hacking, Ian. 1979. “What Is Logic?” The Journal of Philosophy 76: 285–319.Humberstone, Lloyd. 2000. “The Revival of Rejective Negation.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (4): 331–81.Jacinto, Bruno, and Stephen Read. 2017. “General Elimination Stability.” Studia Logica 105: 361–405.MartinLöf, Per. 1996. “On the Meaning of the Logical Constants and the Justification of the Logial Laws.” Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 1: 11–69.Prawitz, Dag. 1965. Natural Deduction: A Proof Theoretical Study. Stockholm: Almqvist; Wiksell.———. 2007. “Pragmatist and Verificationist Theories of Meaning.” In The Philosophy of Michael Dummett, edited by R. E. Auxier and L. E. Hahn, 455–81. Chicago, La Salle: Open Court.Prior, Arthur N. 1960. “The Runabout InferenceTicket.” Analysis 21 (2): 38–39.Queiroz, Ruy de. 2008. “On Reduction Rules, MeaningasUse, and ProofTheoretic Semantics.” Studia Logica.Read, Stephen. 2010. “GeneralElimination Harmony and the Meaning of the Logical Constants.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 39: 557–76.Restall, Greg. 2005. “Multiple Conclusions.” In Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the Twelfth International Congress, edited by Petr Hájek, Luis ValdésVillanueva, and Dag Westerståhl, 189–205. KCL Publications. http://www.consequently.org/writing/multipleconclusions/.———. 2010. “Proof Theory and Meaning: On the Context of Deducibility.” In Logic Colloquium 2007, 204–19. Cambridge University Press.Rumfitt, Ian. 2000. “‘Yes’ and ‘No’.” Mind 109 (436): 781–823.———. 2008. “Coordination Principles: A Reply.” Mind 117 (468): 1059–63. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzn032.SchroederHeister, Peter. 2006. “Validity Concepts in ProofTheoretic Semantics.” Synthese 148 (3): 525–71.———. 2007a. “Definitional Reasoning in ProofTheoretic Semantics and the Square of Opposition.” In The Square of Opposition: A General Framework for Cognition, edited by JeanYves Béziau and Gillman Payette, 323–49. Peter Lang.———. 2007b. “Generalized Definitional Reflection and the Inversion Principle.” Logica Universalis 1: 355–76.———. 2008. “Sequent Calculi and Bidirectional Natural Deduction: On the Proper Basis of ProofTheoretic Semantics.” The Logica Yearbook, 237–51.———. 2011. “The Categorical and the Hypothetical: A Critique of Some Fundamental Assumptions of Standard Semantics.” Synthese 187 (3): 925–42. https://doi.org/10.1007/s112290119910z.———. 2018. “ProofTheoretic Semantics.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2018. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/prooftheoreticsemantics/; Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.Steinberger, Florian. 2011. “What Harmony Could and Could Not Be.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89: 617–39.Tennant, Neil. 2017. Core Logic. Oxford University Press.Ungar, A. M. 1992. Normalization, CutElimination, and the Theory of Proofs. Stanford: CSLI Publications.ValleInclan, Pedro del, and Julian J Schlöder. 2022. “Coordination and Harmony in Bilateral Logic.” Mind, July. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac012.


CV

This website
The short version is here.
The technical aspects. This site is made with Hugo and hosted on GitHub  so Bogdan borrowed Rohan's idea of stealing consequently's idea. Using Hugo was quite unnecessary: Bogdan soon realised that he needs to write a theme. For that, he'd have had to understand the syntax of Go. But his procrastination needs are nowhere near so complex. So, he went over to codrops, lawfully appropriated this template, and cheerfully (and mercilessly) hacked the css and html provided. By Paris, you should enjoy the result: the colour scheme of the previous live version was inspired by the rainbow lorikeet.
The grand perspective. It's grand but simple and elaborated by John Perry. Bogdan had bucketloads of work to do, so he decided to revive his website.